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Introduction 
 
The Doha Round of trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been labeled the 
‘development round’, a key part of which will be increasing developing countries’ access to developed 
country markets. This process will involve the reduction of tariffs on agricultural commodities given that 
many developing countries are still major agricultural exporters and that agriculture still accounts for a 
large share of GDP particularly in the poorest developing countries.  In analyzing the impact of trade 
liberalization, it is necessary to understand the vertical linkages that characterize food markets in many 
developed  countries.    Given  that  the  food  marketing  system  is  most  appropriately  characterized  by 
successive oligopoly/oligopsony with developing country exporters of raw commodities entering at the 
first stage, the implication of reducing tariffs is likely different in magnitude from that implied by models 
that  assume  perfect  competition.  Moreover,  the  distributional  effects  will  also  differ  relative  to  the 
perfectly competitive case and may result, somewhat paradoxically, in developing countries receiving a 
lower share of the total value added within the food chain as trade reform occurs. 
 In this context, the objectives of this paper are twofold: first, we develop a model that characterizes 
the vertically-linked nature of developed country food markets.  The model is based on a market setting 
where a primary agricultural product is exported from a developing economy, and it is processed and sold 
in  a  developed  economy.    The  market  structure  in  the  developed  economy  features  independent 
processing  and  retailing  sectors,  both  of  which  may  exhibit  market  power.    Second,  we  derive  the 
implications of various combinations of market structures in the processing and/or the retailing sector on 
total market surplus, and the distribution of surplus among consumers, producers, and marketers, i.e., 
processors and retailers, given price-taking behavior by farm producers in the developing country and by 
consumers in the importing country.  From this we are able to simulate the effects of reducing a per unit 
import tariff on the raw agricultural commodity.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section 1, we provide a brief overview of the characteristics of 
the food industry in the United States and the European Union (EU). In section 2, we describe a generic 
vertical market model that characterizes the vertically-linked nature of developed country food markets  
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and how the market structure may influence the gains from the reduction in tariffs on raw agricultural 
commodity exports. In section 3, we simulate the effects of tariff reduction through this vertical market 
model. Some extensions are outlined in section 4, and finally in section 5 we summarize and conclude. 
 
1.  Market Structure of the Food Sector in Developed Economies 
As noted in the introduction, the food industry is typically highly concentrated in developed countries at 
both the retail and processing stages. This is also becoming a characteristic of the food sector in some 
developing countries.  By way of illustration, we focus specifically on these sectors in the United States 
and the EU. 
(i)  Food Processing 
In the United States, a small number of large firms dominate the food-processing sector, with the top-20 
food- and tobacco-manufacturing firms accounting for over 52 percent of the sector’s value added in 
1995.  If food manufacturing is separated from beverage and tobacco manufacturing, the top-20 food-
manufacturing firms accounted for 37 percent of value added in 1997, while the top-20 beverage- and 
tobacco-manufacturing firms accounted for 79 percent of value added (US Census Bureau, 2001).  Using 
more disaggregated data at the four-digit SITC level, the average 4-firm concentration ratio was just 
below 76 percent in 1997, ranging from 62 percent in sugar cane mills to 98 percent in cigarettes.  
Turning to food manufacturing in the EU, the data show that typically at the country level, average 
seller concentration is higher than in the United States, ranging from an average 3-firm concentration ratio 
of 55 percent in Germany to 89 percent in Ireland, with an average 3-firm concentration ratio across 9 EU 
countries of 67 percent (Cotterill, 1999).  As in the United States, these averages hide some high levels of 
seller concentration for specific products in each EU country, most notably baby foods, canned soup, pet 
food, and coffee.  It should be noted, however, that while seller concentration at the product level is high 
in many individual EU country markets, there are few examples of firms that dominate sales across EU 
countries as a whole (Cotterill, op.cit.). 
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(ii)  Food Retailing 
Several important differences are apparent in the food retailing market structures in the US and EU.  5-
firm seller concentration in food retailing at the national level is much higher in EU countries than it is in 
the US, with average 5-firm seller concentration in the former being 65 percent, compared to 35 percent 
in the latter (Cotterill; McCorriston, 2002).  However, at the EU-wide level, 5-firm seller concentration is 
much lower at 26 percent (Hughes, 2002).  In addition, in the US, it is important to examine concentration 
in food retailing at the local and regional level.  Cotterill reports that in 1998, 4-firm seller concentration 
averaged  74  percent  across  the  top  100  US  cities,  while  across  major  US  regions,  4-firm  seller 
concentration averaged 58 percent. 
(iii)   Industry Consolidation 
An additional feature of market structure in the food industry in recent years has been consolidation 
through  mergers  and  acquisitions  which  has  contributed  to  increasing  concentration.  Moreover, 
international  mergers  and  acquisitions  have  also  been  increasing  significantly  not  only  involving 
acquisitions  in  developed  country  markets  by  firms  located  in  other  developed  countries,  but  also 
involving acquisitions in developing countries too. To give some examples, EU-based retailers such as 
Royal Ahold and Sainsbury have expanded into the US market (Cotterill), Carrefour and Royal Ahold 
have expanded into various developing country markets in Central and Latin America (Chavez, 2002; 
Farina, 2002; Gutman, 2002), and Wal-Mart have expanded into the EU (Hughes, op. cit.) and Central 
and Latin America food sectors (Chavez op. cit.; Farina, op. cit.). As a result, food retailing is becoming 
increasingly multinational with three food retailers Wal-Mart, Carrefour, and Royal Ahold now appearing 
in the world’s top 100 multinational corporations (UNCTAD, 2002a). 
In addition, as a consequence of this trend in mergers and acquisitions, food retailing in developing 
countries  most  notably  Latin  America,  is  becoming  more  concentrated,  with  multinational  firms 
accounting for the largest share of sales in several countries (Reardon and Berdegué, 2002).  For example, 
the average share of the top five supermarket chains in supermarket sales in Latin America for 2001/2 
was 75 percent, ranging from 47 percent in Brazil in to 99 per cent in Guatemala.  At the same time the  
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share of multinational firms in the sales of the top five supermarket chains averaged 88 percent, ranging 
from 18 percent in Chile to 94 percent in Guatemala (Reardon and Berdegué, ibid). United States and EU-
based multinational food manufacturing firms are also very prominent in some developing countries.  For 
example, Nestlé is the leading processing firm in terms of sales in Brazil (Farina, op. cit.).  Belik and 
Santos (2002) also report on the extent to which foreign-based multinational firms such as Parmalat, 
Danone, Unilever, and Philip Morris, have been entering the Latin American market through mergers and 
acquisitions. 
 
2.  Agricultural Trade and Importing Country Market Power  
Given  this  background,  we  now  consider  a  market  setting  where  a  primary  agricultural  product  is 
exported from a developing economy, and it is processed and sold in a developed economy.
1  The market 
structure in the developed economy features independent processing and retailing sectors, both of which 
may exhibit market power.
2   
Consumers’ inverse excess demand in the developed economy for the retail product is 
(1)  P
r  = D(Q
r,| X),  
where Q
r is the market quantity of the retail product, P
r is the market price, and X denotes unspecified 
demand shifters.  Farmers in the developing country are assumed to be price takers in their output market.  
Inverse excess farm supply of the raw commodity is expressed as 
(2)  P




f is the price received at the farm, Q
f is the total volume of farm shipments, and Y represents 
unspecified supply shifters.  The raw product is subject to a per-unit import tariff of T.  
To focus the model on the implications of possible market power in the marketing sector of the 
developed  economy,  we  make  a  number  of  simplifying  assumptions  about  the  technologies  for  the 
                                                 
1 The model need not be interpreted narrowly in the context of bilateral trade.  The excess demand function in (1) 
can refer to world demand for the commodity produced in the developing economy, in which case market power 
could arise due to the behavior of multinational firms and also state trading agencies (Sexton and Lavoie,2001).  
2 This model is adapted from prior work by Huang and Sexton (1996), Alston, Sexton, and Zhang (1997), and 
Sexton and Zhang (2001)  
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processing and retailing sectors. Processors are assumed to utilize a, fixed-proportions, constant-returns 
technology  to  convert  the  raw  farm  product  into  a  finished  product  and,  similarly,  food  retailers’ 
technology also exhibits both fixed proportions and constant returns and is separable across the various 
products sold at retail.  For convenience and without further loss of generality, we choose to measure 
units so that Q
f = Q
w = Q
r = Q, where the superscripts f, w, and r denote the farm, wholesale, and retail 
sectors,  respectively.    Given  these  assumptions,  changes  in  market  concentration  have  no  cost-side 
effects, enabling the analysis to focus solely on the competition impacts. 
Denote  a  representative  processing  firm’s  volume  of  raw  product  purchases  by  q
f.    Given  our 










w) represents the constant processing costs per unit of raw product processed, V
w is the vector 
of prices for variable processing inputs, and P
f is the raw product price received by producers in the 
developing economy. 
Denote a representative retailer’s volume of wholesale purchases by q
w.  A representative retailer’s 









w is the wholesale price, c
r(V
r) represents the constant retailing costs per unit of wholesale product 
sold, and V
r is the vector of prices for variable retailing inputs.   
We now derive the implications of various combinations of oligopoly and oligopsony power in the 
processing  and/or the  retailing  sector  on total  market surplus,  and  the  distribution  of  surplus among 
consumers, producers, and marketers (i.e., processors and retailers), given price-taking behavior by farm 
producers in the developing country and by consumers in the importing country. To simplify notation, we 




                                                 
3 In the modeling framework set forth here, these “shift” variables have particular relevance as policy variables that 
can be set at a prior time by government or industry members to affect the subsequent market competition.  The 
tariff variable, T, is one example of such a shift variable, but the concept applies generally.  Sexton (2000) provides 
more discussion of this two-stage modeling approach.  
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(i)  Manufacturers or Retailers May Have Both Oligopsony and Oligopoly Power  
In this case we assume that either retailers or manufacturers are price takers, i.e., given market power in 
one of the marketing sectors, the other sector is competitive.  Given the model structure, the output, farm 
price, consumer price, and aggregate welfare effects are identical for a given degree of market power 
regardless  of  whether  the  power  is  held  by  food  processors  or  by  food  retailers.    To  simplify  the 
exposition, we develop the case where food manufacturers may exercise market power and retailers are 




A representative processing firm’s profit function can be expressed as 
(5) 
w w r f w (D(Q ) c )q S(Q )q (c T)q p = - - - + ,    
where q = q
w = q
f is the firm’s level of output and volume of farm product purchases.  The first-order 
necessary condition for maximizing equation (5) is 
(6) 
w w w f f
w f w
w f
D(Q ) Q S(Q ) Q
P q (P c T) q 0.
q Q q Q q
¶p ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
= + - + + - =
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
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￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ x q




















 is the 
absolute value of the market price elasticity of derived demand for the processed product when the retailer 


















 are market-power parameters or conjectural 
elasticities, as introduced previously.  Here ￿
f ￿ [0,1] measures the processing firm’s oligopsony market 
power in procuring the farm product and ￿
w ￿ [0,1] measures the firm’s oligopoly power in selling the 
product to retailers.  By focusing directly on the end product of oligopoly/oligopsony power, as measured 
by  the  parameters  ￿  and  ￿,  we  need  not  be  concerned  with  particular  market  structures  or  
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oligopoly/oligopsony games. This makes the model a very convenient tool for conducting simulations of 
alternative competitive scenarios. 
Aggregation from the firm to the industry is accomplished readily within this model framework. Because 
firms produce a homogeneous product and have identical technologies, optimizing behavior compels that ex 
post  all  firms’  conjectures  are  identical  (Wann  and  Sexton,  1992).    Equation  (6’)  thus  represents  an 
equilibrium condition that, in conjunction with the retail demand and farm supply functions specified in (1) 
and (2), respectively, and the retailer cost function, (4), yields equilibrium values for P
r, P
w, P
f, and Q. 
(ii)  Market Power at Successive Market Stages  
Here we consider scenarios where retailers in the importing country may exercise oligopoly power over 
consumers and domestic processors may exercise oligopsony power over farmers in procuring the raw 
product, and, in addition, processor-retailer interactions may be characterized by imperfect competition.  
We consider two alternative cases for the processor-retailer interactions.  The first involves processor 
oligopoly power and retailer price taking in the processor-retailer interactions (successive oligopoly), and 
the second involves retailer oligopsony power and processor price taking (successive oligopsony) in the 
processor-retailer interactions.  The case where both retailers and processors attempt to exercise market 
power in their mutual interactions must be studied within a bargaining environment, which is beyond the 
scope of the present study.
4 
For the case of successive oligopoly power, a representative retailer’s profit function can be expressed 
as 
(7)  
r w r D(Q)q P q c q p = - - ,    




r P 1 P c
￿ ￿ x
- = + ￿ ￿ h ￿ ￿
. 
                                                 
4 One plausible outcome of processor-retailer bargaining is that  they  would agree on the volume of trade that 
maximized  their  mutual  benefit,  with  bargaining  restricted  to  determining  the  division  of  surplus  between  the 
bargainers.   This outcome is identical in terms of output, retail price, farm price, and welfare distribution to the 
equilibria described in the previous subsection when only processors or retailers exercised market power.  
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Using the retail demand function, D(Q), to substitute for P
r in (8), we can solve equation (8) for the 





A representative processing firm’s profit function can then be expressed as 
(9) 
w w w D (Q)q S(Q)q (c T)q p = - - + .  






P 1 P 1 (c T)
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ x q
- = + + + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ h e ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
, 
where x
w denotes the degree of the processors’ oligopoly power, and 
w
2 h  is the elasticity of derived 
demand, given retailer oligopoly power (in general, 
w w
1 2 h ¹ h ).  Equations (1), (2), (8), and (10) define the 
market equilibrium for the case of successive oligopoly power, and, given functional forms for (1) and 
(2), they can be used to solve for the endogenous variables, P
f, P
w, P
r, and Q. 
For the case of successive oligopsony power, a representative processor’s profit function can be 
expressed as 
(11)   
w w w P q S(Q)q (c T)q p = - - + ,    




f P P 1 (c T)
￿ ￿ q
= + + + ￿ ￿ e ￿ ￿
. 
Equation (12) can be used in conjunction with the inverse farm supply curve S(Q) to yield the inverse 






A representative retailer’s profit function can be expressed as 
(13)  
r w r D(Q)q S (Q)q c q p = - - .    




r w P 1 P 1 c
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ x q
- = + + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ h e ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
.  
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Market equilibrium for this case is defined by equations (1), (2), (12), and (14).  
 
3.  Simulation Analysis 
To conduct simulations, it is necessary to assign specific functional forms for the retail demand and farm 
excess supply functions specified in general form in equations (1) and (2).  We chose linear models for 
this purpose: 
(1’)  Q
r = a – aP
r,  importing country excess demand at retail, 
(2’)  P
f = b + bQ
f,  exporting country inverse farm excess supply. 
In addition, we invoke the normalizations that are available without loss of generality by choosing 
units so that the quantity and retail price in the competitive, no-tariff equilibrium, (Qc, 
r
c P ), are each 
unity: 
 
r w r f r w
c c c c Q 1, P 1, in which case P 1 c , P 1 c c f, = = = - = - - =  where f is farmers’ revenue 
share under the no-tariff competitive equilibrium, and, thus f measures the intrinsic importance of the 
farm product in producing the final product.  Given the normalizations, the following relationships among 
the model’s parameters are readily derived: 










c h  is the absolute value of retail price elasticity of demand and  f
c e  is the price elasticity of farm 
supply elasticity, each evaluated at the no-tariff, competitive equilibrium. 
Introducing a per-unit tariff, T, charged to the farm product causes supply of the farm product to the 
domestic-country processing sector to become: 
(2’’)  P
f + T = b + bQ
f + T. 
(i)  Equilibrium under Processor Oligopoly and/or Oligopsony Power 
We consider first the case where either the processing sector or the retailing sector may exercise oligopoly 
and/or oligopsony power, but the other downstream sector is competitive.  Given the structure of the  
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model,  equilibrium  output,  farm  price,  retail  price,  and  distribution  of  welfare  among  producers, 
marketers (i.e., processors and retailers), and consumers are identical if the same magnitudes of market 
power are exercised by either the retail sector or the manufacturing sector.  The same results also hold for 
the rather plausible case where processors exercise oligopsony power over farmers and retailers exercise 
oligopoly power over consumers, but the interactions between processors and retailers are conducted 
under conditions of perfect competition.   
For consistency with the prior section, we develop the case where retailers behave competitively, and 
processors  may  exercise  market  power.    Thus,  P
r  =  P
w  +  c
r,  and  we  can  solve  (1’),  (2’’),  and  (6’) 
simultaneously to obtain the following equilibrium solutions for the linear model: 
(16) 
w r r w r f 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1 ( T) a Q
Q , P c , P P c , P b Q ,
+ a b- -




w f w f r f
1 c c (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )f / W = +x + + q ab = +x + + q h e .  The expression ￿1 measures the total 
distortion due to oligopoly and oligopsony power in the linear model, and Q1 < 1 = Qc whenever either ￿
f 
or  ￿
w  is  positive.  Figure  1  illustrates  the  model.
5  Note  also  that  this  general  specification  nests  the 
competitive equilibrium, which is obtained when ￿
w = ￿
f = 0.   

























b b ￿  
(19)  
w r r f
1 1 1 1 1 1 [P P 1 f T]Q P = P + P = - - + - . 
(20)  R1 = TQ1 
                                                 
5 Figures 1-3 rely on Melnick and Shalit’s (1985) observation that an industry with oligopoly power acts as if it 
faces a perceived marginal revenue (PMR) curve that consists of a linear combination of the marginal revenue 
curve, [D(Q)Q]/ Q ¶ ¶ , and the market demand curve, D(Q), with ￿ representing the weight attributed to the marginal 
revenue curve and (1-￿) representing the weight attributed to the demand curve.  Similarly, for an industry with 
oligopsony power, the perceived marginal factor cost curve is ￿MC(Q) + (1-￿)S(Q), where MC = ￿[S(Q)Q]/￿Q 
denotes the marginal factor cost curve.  
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(21)  ES1 = CS1 + PS1 + ￿1 + R1 
Given the constant-cost characterization of the marketing sector (processing and retailing), the sector 
earns zero profits in competitive equilibrium: ￿1 = 0. 
In the linear version of the model, the market equilibrium prices, output, and distribution of economic 
welfare are determined by six parameters: x
w (seller oligopoly power), q
f (buyer oligopsony power), 
r
c h  
(price elasticity of retail demand evaluated at the no-tariff competitive equilibrium), 
f
c e  (price elasticity of 
farm supply evaluated at the no-tariff competitive equilibrium, f (farm revenue share in the no-tariff 
competitive equilibrium), and T (magnitude of the per-unit tariff).  In this model, the per-unit tariff 
functions  identically  to  the  constant  per-unit  costs,  c
r  and  c
w,  incurred  by  retailers  and  processors, 
respectively.  The larger is T, ceteris paribus, the less important is processor oligopsony power as a factor 
in  determining  the  market  equilibrium.    Intuitively,  T  represents  an  additional  wedge  (along  with 
processor and retailer costs) between consumers and farm producers.  When the farm input price is a 
small component of retail value, the structure of the market for procurement of the input does not matter 
much in determining the market equilibrium at retail. 
(ii)  Market Power at Successive Vertical Stages 
We consider first the case of successive oligopoly power.  For the linear version of the model, the market 
equilibrium under successive oligopoly power is defined by equations (1’), (2’’), (8), and (10):  
w w r f 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
2
1 ( T) a Q
Q , P b Q c , P , P b Q ,
+a b- -




r w f r w f r f
2 c c (1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 )f / W = + x + x + +q ab = +x +x + + q h e .  In this case the market 





c c , h e , f and T.  In 
addition to the parameters contained in the preceding case, a second ￿ parameter reflects the degree of 




r in figures 2 and 3 represents the retail sector’s derived demand for the farm product at the  
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wholesale level, given the retailers’ oligopoly power—see footnote 5. The reduction in output from Q1 to 
Q2 in figure 2 represents the incremental distortion to output from successive oligopoly power. 
Finally, the market equilibrium with successive oligopsony power is defined for the linear version of 
the model by equations (1’), (2’’), (12) and (14).  Solving the system yields the following solutions for the 
endogenous variables: 
w w r f 3
3 3 3 3 3 3
3
1 ( T) a Q
Q , P b Q c , P , P b Q ,
+ a b- -




r f w r f w r f
3 c c (1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 )f / W = +x + +q + q ab = +x + +q + q h e .  The  market  equilibrium 





c c , h e , f, and T, with the seventh 
parameter in this case reflecting the possibility of oligopsony power at successive stages.  The successive 
oligopsony case is illustrated in figure 3, where the reduction in output from Q1 to Q3 represents the 
incremental distortion in output due to successive oligopsony power.  
In structuring simulations for these various competition scenarios, the parameter f, the farm share of 
revenue under the no-tariff competitive equilibrium was fixed at f = 1 - c
w - c
r = 0.5. The primary effect of f in 
the model is to influence the importance of oligopsony power on output and welfare in the market.  When f is 
small, the farm input is not an important determinant of the final product value, and, thus, oligopsony power 
in the farm sector has only a minor impact on total market output and consumer welfare.  The presence of a 
tariff diminishes the farm share of the total retail expenditure under any form of competition, and, thus, a 
tariff reduces the relative importance of processor oligopsony power in determining the market equilibrium. 
We consider 
r f
c c 1.0 h = e =  as a base case for the farm supply and retail demand elasticities (evaluated 
at the no-tariff competitive equilibrium).  Given 
f
c 1.0 e = and f = 0.5, the retail supply elasticity evaluated 
at  the  competitive  equilibrium  is
r
c 2.0 e = .
6    Given  the  linear  formulations  for  retail  supply  and  farm 
                                                 
6 The distortion from a given degree of market power market power is always proportional to the elasticity of the 
demand curve (in the case of oligopoly power) or supply curve (in the case of oligopsony power) that is being  
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demand the elasticities change as output changes along the curves to reflect alternative forms of imperfectly 
competitive equilibria.  However, the relative magnitudes of alternative elasticity specifications are the same 
across the various imperfect competition equilibria, and, thus, it suffices to fix the elasticities at a particular 
point, such as the competitive equilibrium, to simulate the effects of alternative elasticity specifications. 
The  most  important  parameters  for  the  purposes  of  the  simulation  analysis  are  the  market  power 
parameters, ￿ and ￿, which both range in the unit interval.  As summarized by Sheldon and Sperling (2003), 
most point estimates of ￿ and/or ￿ from prior empirical studies, are quite low--0.2 or less.  However, Bhuyan 
and Lopez (1997) obtained estimates of ￿ that were considerably higher for some industries in their ambitious 
study of oligopoly power for all U.S. four-digit SIC food and beverage industries.  For example, 2043 cereal 
preparation, 2041 flour & grain mills, 2075 soybean oil mills yielded estimates of ￿ of about 0.5.  Given the 
recent increases in consolidation of food manufacturing and food retailing in many countries, the past studies 
may understate current levels of market power.  In addition, the limitations of the extant empirical literature 
outlined in Sexton (op. cit.) probably serve on balance to understate the extent of market power.
7  To gain a 
broad perspective of the effects of market power on the impacts of tariff reduction, we conduct simulations 
over  the  entire  unit  interval  for  the  market  conduct  parameters.    However,  to  facilitate  a  graphical 
presentation of results, we always consider equal relative departures from competition for each sector that is 
exercising market power in the simulation.  For example, in simulating market behavior under successive 




(iii)  Simulation Results 
The  primary  purpose  of  the  simulations  is  to  examine  the  impact  of  trade  liberalization  in  a  market 
environment characterized by buyer and/or seller market power in the importing country.  However, it is first 
useful to gain a perspective as to how market power, including market power at successive vertical stages, 
                                                                                                                                                             
exploited.  Setting 
r f
c c h = e has the virtue that the relative importance of oligopoly  vs. oligopsony power is  not 
distorted by differences in the underlying elasticities of retail demand or farm supply. 
7 For example, this conclusion would apply to (i) analysis of inappropriately broad product markets, (ii) failure to 
account for the possibility of market power upstream or downstream from the stage being analyzed, and (iii) failure 
to account for technical change and/or economies of scale in costs.  
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can affect market performance.  Figure 4 depicts the effect of market power on producer welfare.  Five 
market power scenarios are considered: (i) oligopsony only (ii) oligopoly only, (iii) both oligopoly, and 
oligopsony, (iv) successive oligopsony and retailer oligopsony, and (v) successive oligopoly and processor 
oligopsony.  It bears repeating that, given the structure of the model, it does not matter in terms of output, 
farm price, retail price, and the distribution of welfare among producers, consumers, and marketers whether 
oligopoly or oligopsony is exercised by the processing sector or by the retailing sector. 
Figure 4 shows the percent change in producer welfare relative to perfect competition, as a function of 
the degree of downstream market power.  A given degree of downstream oligopoly power is always more 
damaging to producer welfare than the same degree of downstream oligopsony power because the oligopoly 
power affects the entire final product, whereas the oligopsony power applies only to the raw product input.  
Thus, ceteris paribus, a given degree of oligopoly power will always reduce market output more than will a 
given degree of oligopsony power.  Figure 4 makes clear that, even modest levels of market power, such as 
have been found in the empirical literature, can in combination have a very damaging impact upon the 
welfare of producers in the developing economy.  For example, successive oligopoly power combined with 
processor oligopsony power of 0.2 (￿
r = ￿
w = ￿
f = 0.2) combine to reduce producer surplus by about 45 
percent relative to perfect competition in all downstream sectors.  Extreme cases of high levels of market 
power occurring  at  multiple  stages  can erode three fourths  or  more  of producer surplus relative to the 
competitive equilibrium. 
Figure  5 illustrates the  effect  of  downstream  market  power  on total  economic  surplus  (the  sum  of 
producer surplus, consumer surplus, and marketer profits) in the market.  Figure 6 illustrates the distribution 
of  economic  surplus  among  producers,  consumers  and  marketers  for  the  case  of  processor  oligopsony 
combined with retailer oligopoly (but no successive market power).  Figures 5 and 6 combine to illustrate 
some important points regarding the efficiency and distributional impacts of market power in a vertical 
market chain.  First, modest levels of market power have small efficiency effects.  Figure 5 shows that even 
successive oligopoly plus oligopsony or successive oligopsony plus oligopoly generate efficiency losses 
relative to perfect competition of 10 percent or less so long as the market power is modest--￿ and ￿ values of  
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0.2 or less.  However, figure 6 shows that the distributional effects of market power are large even for modest 
departures from competition.  Perfectly competitive marketers earn no profits in this model, but ￿
r = ￿
f = 0.2 
or more enables the marketing sector’s surplus to exceed the surplus earned by the producing sector, and ￿
r = 
￿
f = 0.4 or more enables marketers’ surplus to exceed consumers’.  For the extreme case of ￿
r = ￿
f = 1.0, 
marketers would capture fully two thirds of the available economic surplus. 
The aforementioned results on the efficiency impacts of market power are consistent with prior work, 
dating as far back as the original work by Harberger (1954).  However, figure 5 also illustrates that markets 
with large  departures from  competition  that  are  repeated across  multiple  vertical stages  can  have  large 
efficiency losses.  For example, the case of successive oligopoly plus oligopsony where ￿
r = ￿
w = ￿
f = 0.5 
(i.e., Cournot duopolies and duopsony) reduces the total economic surplus in the market by about 25 percent. 
Now consider trade liberalization in terms of eliminating the per-unit tariff T = 0.2 (a 20 percent tariff at 
the competitive equilibrium).  Figure 7 depicts the absolute change in farm price from removing the tariff for 
alternative competition scenarios.  Given that 
r r
c c 2 1 e = > h = , producers bear only one third of the incidence 
of the tariff in competitive equilibrium.  Thus, abolishing the tariff raises the farm price by ￿P
f = 0.067 in the 
competitive equilibrium.  ￿P
f is a decreasing function of the degree of downstream market power because an 
imperfectly competitive marketing sector always captures a share of the benefits of an exogenous shock of 
this type. 
The important question is the extent to which downstream market power vitiates the benefits to the 
developing economy of trade liberalization.  Figure 7 shows that the price increase generated from trade 
liberalization is dissipated considerably by significant departures from competition, especially when they 
occur in multiple stages of the downstream market.  For example, in the case of successive oligopoly power 
plus processor oligopsony, modest market power manifest by ￿
r = ￿
w = ￿
f = 0.2 reduces the farm price 
increase from tariff removal by 27 percent, while the more extreme scenario of ￿
r = ￿
w = ￿
f = 0.5 reduces the 
price increase by fully half. 
The effect of market power on the increase in producer welfare caused by trade liberalization is more  
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pronounced than the effect on price because producer surplus is determined both by the change in farm price 
and the change in output, and market power diminishes both.  Figure 8 depicts the change in producer welfare 
from  trade  liberalization  for  alternative  competitive  scenarios.    Consider  again  the  case  of  successive 
oligopoly plus processor oligopsony power.  The modest market power represented by ￿
r = ￿
w = ￿
f = 0.2 
reduces the producer surplus increase from trade liberalization by over half, while ￿
r = ￿
w = ￿
f = 0.5 reduces it 
by 75 percent. 
Next consider the distribution of benefits from trade liberalization across producers, consumers, and 
marketers depicted in figures 9 and 10.  Figure 9 represents the case of processor oligopsony and retailer 
oligopoly,  while  figure  10  represents  successive  oligopoly  plus  processor  oligopsony.    Producer  and 
consumer welfare both decline monotonically in the degree of market power exercised.  Marketers’ profit 
rises monotonically as a function of ￿
r = ￿




f  for  high  values  of  market  power  in  the  successive-oligopoly-plus-oligopsony  case.    This  outcome 
illustrates an important feature of market power generally and of successive market power in particular.  
Agents who exercise market power always impose a negative externality on the other participants in the 
market.  Thus, rising values of ￿
r = ￿
w = ￿
f represent higher absolute levels of market power exercised by 
marketers, but the negative externality imposed on processors’ profits when retailers increase their market 
power (and vice versa) dominates the higher profits earned by the retailer, causing overall marketing sector 
profits to fall for high levels of market power exercised at successive stages.
8 
 Both figures 9 and 10 demonstrate that the distributional effects of market power are quite dramatic.  
Even rather modest levels of market power enable the marketing sector to capture the largest share of the 
benefits from trade liberalization, and for very high levels of market power, the marketing sector captures the 
lion’s share of the benefits.  Clearly, the presence of downstream market power is an important issue when 
considering the impacts of trade liberalization. 
 
                                                 
8 This result provides an incentive for vertical coordination in the marketing chain to internalize these external 
effects.  
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4.  Extensions 
A great many extensions and generalizations of this simulation framework are possible, and we mention only 
a few here.  All of the results discussed here are conditional upon the base values of
f r
c c 1 e = h = , and f = 0.5.  
The specific results will change as these base values change, although the qualitative conclusions do not 
change.  Moreover, the effects of changing these variables are readily determined.  More inelastic farm 
supply will exacerbate the anticompetitive impacts of processor oligopsony power, and a more inelastic retail 
demand will exacerbate the impacts of retailer oligopoly power.  A smaller farm share will diminish the 
importance of oligopsony power for any value of ￿. 
We have modeled the case of a constant per-unit tariff, but many tariffs are ad valorem.  The impacts of 
removing  an  ad  valorem  tariff  are  also  readily  simulated,  although  the  ad  valorem  tariff  adds  some 
complications to the modeling relative to a per-unit tariff.  In particular, because the ad valorem tariff affects 
the slope of the downstream supply functions derived from the farm supply function, the simple proportional 
relationship between price elasticity at the farm level and at retail (
r f /f e = e ), that holds for the per-unit 
tariff, does not hold for the ad valorem tariff.  Indeed, an ad valorem tariff makes the downstream supply 
relationships less elastic, ceteris paribus, and, thus, an ad valorem tariff can exacerbate the distortion from 
oligopsony  power  in  the  retailer-processor  interaction.
9    Removing  the  tariff  will  actually  reduce  the 
distortion from a given degree of retailer oligopsony power, which will provide an additional welfare benefit 
from trade liberalization. 
Finally, in this paper we have ignored the issue of tariff escalation.
10  Tariff escalation occurs when 
tariffs on imports of processed goods are higher than the tariffs on the corresponding raw commodity. 
This issue is well known from the work of Balassa (1965) and Corden (1971), and UNCTAD (2002b) has 
recently  cited  tariff  escalation  as  one  of  the  main  problems  facing  developing  country  exporters  in 
diversifying their export profile.    However, it is possible that this disadvantage could be offset by 
                                                 
9 Alston, Sexton, and Zhang (1997) study the effects of a proportional shift downward in farm supply caused by 
public-sector research when the downstream market may be imperfectly competitive. 
10  In Sexton, Sheldon, McCorriston and Wang (2003),  we show that depending upon the particular market power 
configuration, the developing country may do better by integrating the processing function despite tariff escalation.  
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potential improvements in the competitive environment when, in the absence of downstream integration, 
the developing country must sell to processors in the importing country who have market power.  Even if 
the processing sector that evolves in a developing economy is itself oligopsonistic, at least the oligopsony 
profits  are  apt  to  be  captured  locally.
11    However,  downstream  processing  is  more  beneficial  to  the 
developing  economy  if  it  takes  place  under  conditions  of  perfect  competition.    One  way  to  induce 
competitive  behavior  in  the  processing  sector  would  be  to  organize  it  around  producer-owned 
cooperatives, which would operate on a zero-profit basis, which in the context of the present model is 
analytically equivalent to a competitive basis. 
 
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
Taken  together,  the  vertically  related,  highly-concentrated  nature  of  the  food  sector  in  developed 
countries raises many issues for developing countries attempting to increase market access and the returns 
from  exporting  agricultural  and  food  products.  These  issues  have,  by  and  large,  been  ignored  by 
economists  and  policy-makers  in  providing  estimates  about  what  further  trade  reform  may  bring  to 
developing  countries.  Consequently,  to  fully  understand  the  implications  of  trade  reform  for  raw 
commodity exporters, further attention needs to be paid to the issue of industry consolidation and market 
structure in developed country food markets. 
In this context, there are two key results to be drawn from this paper.  First, if developing country 
exporters face a marketing system characterized by a structure of successive oligopoly/oligopsony, and 
the  associated  problem  of  double  marginalization,  reduction  of  import  tariffs,  while  increasing  raw 
commodity prices, will not result in exporters obtaining a larger share of the consumer´s food “dollar” in 
developed countries.  This follows from the fact that if the retail demand function (farm excess supply 
function)  is  linear,  and  given  oligopoly  (oligopsony)  mark-ups  (mark-downs)  of  price  over  (below) 
marginal cost (marginal resource cost), firms in the food retailing and processing sectors are able to 
                                                 
11 For example in the case of the Mozambique raw cashew nut sector, McMillan, Rodrik and Welch (2002) assumed 
that  traders  downstream  from  farmers  were  competitive  in  selling  cashews,  but  had  monopsony  power  in  the 
purchase of cashews.  
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capture most of the benefits of a reduction in the tariff on the imported raw agricultural commodity.  This 
implies that developing country exporters will benefit much less from trade liberalization by developed 
countries than is being forecast by development agencies such as the World Bank (2003), and non-
governmental organizations such as Oxfam (2003).  
Second,  as  the  food  processing  and  retailing  sectors  become  more  concentrated  in  developed 
countries, and hence less competitive, this will reduce even further the share of commodity exporters in 
the  available  rents  in  the  food  marketing  system.    This  comes  about  from  the  fact  that  with  less 
competitive food retailing and processing, the relevant marginal revenue (marginal resource cost) curves 
become steeper, allowing the oligopoly (oligopsony) mark-ups (mark-downs) to increase.   This generates 
the  key  policy  implication  that  developing  country  exporters  may  benefit  as  much  from  vertically 
integrating into food processing and other value-adding activities further down the vertical marketing 
chain  as  from  trade  liberalization.    This  result  provides  support  to  development  agencies  such  as 
UNCTAD (2000; 2002b) that have been advising developing country exporters to adopt a policy of 
diversifying into value-added activities in the food marketing system.  
 





































Note: Figure 1 illustrates the outcome for x
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Note: Figure 2 illustrates the outcome when x
w = x
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Note: Figure 3 illustrates the outcome when q
f = q
w = x
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Figure 6:  The Effect of Market Power on the Distribution 
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Figure 9:  Change in Producer Surplus, Consumer Surplus 
and Marketers' Profits from Trade Liberalization for the 
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Figure 10:  Change in Producer Surplus, Consumer Surplus 
and Marketers' Profits from Trade Liberalization for the case 
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